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I. INTRODUCTION
When does an armed conflict begin? When does the law of armed
conflict apply? It depends. There are two kinds of armed conflict and two
laws of armed conflict. There are international armed conflicts (IACs)
between states and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) between states
and organized armed groups or between such groups. This distinction
matters because the law of IAC differs from the law of NIAC in certain
important respects.
Accordingly, it is quite important to know when a state is in an IAC with
another state, a NIAC with an armed group, or both at the same time. For
example, is the United States in an IAC with Syria, a NIAC with Daesh, or
both? These are the types of questions this short article will address.
My point of departure is the much-discussed 2016 Commentary on the
First Geneva Convention recently released by the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC). This is as it should be, since the modern distinction
between IAC and NIAC largely originates with Common Articles 2 and 3 of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
The University of Georgia School of Law hosted a wonderful event
examining a number of issues raised by the Commentary, including the duty
to “ensure respect” for the Convention by other Parties, as well as incidental
harm to sick and wounded combatants. This Article grows out of that rich
discussion.
II. TRIGGERS AND THRESHOLDS
When and where does the law of NIAC apply? Since most contemporary
armed conflicts are fought between states and organized armed groups, or
between such groups, these are important questions for both international
lawyers and policy makers. The answers may affect the jurisdiction of U.S.
military commissions, the detention of Taliban commanders and ISIL
members, legal constraints on Saudi-led military operations in Yemen, and
accountability for war crimes in Syria. This section will focus on the trigger
and threshold of NIAC.
The ICRC’s Commentary clearly states that an IAC “can arise when one
State unilaterally uses armed force against another State even if the latter
does not or cannot respond by military means.”1 Accordingly, the law of

1

ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD
¶ 237 (2d ed. 2016), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary.
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armed conflict constrains the first use of armed force by one state against
another. Let’s call this a unilateral trigger.
In addition, “there is no requirement that the use of armed force between
the Parties reach a certain level of intensity before it can be said that an
[international] armed conflict exists.”2 Accordingly, minor skirmishes
between states’ armed forces, or the capture of a single soldier, “would spark
an international armed conflict and lead to the applicability of humanitarian
law.”3 Let’s call this a nominal threshold.
Unfortunately, the Commentary is not so clear with respect to noninternational armed conflict. The Commentary endorses the view that
NIACs “are protracted armed confrontations occurring between
governmental armed forces and . . . one or more armed groups, or between
such groups.”4 This passage, as well as some cited authority, seem to
suggest a bilateral trigger, requiring “armed clashes,” “combat zones,” or,
simply, “fighting.”5
The Commentary also states that, for the law of NIAC to apply, “[t]he
armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity.”6 Read
alongside the Commentary’s discussion of IAC, it seems that this “minimum
level of intensity” would not be met by minor skirmishes or by the capture of
a single soldier or fighter.
The Commentary seems to accept a unilateral trigger and nominal
threshold for IAC (quadrant 1) but a bilateral trigger and significant
threshold for NIAC (quadrant 4).
Nominal threshold
Unilateral trigger

Significant threshold

2016 Commentaries: IAC
2

1

Bilateral trigger

2016 Commentaries: NIAC
3

2

4

Id. ¶ 236.
Id. ¶ 237.
4
ICRC, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW? (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.
pdf (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995)).
5
See, e.g., ICRC, supra note 1.
6
ICRC, supra note 4.
3
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In my view, we should accept a unilateral trigger and nominal threshold for
both IAC and NIAC.
First, if an armed group is sufficiently organized, then a first strike by or
against that group should trigger a NIAC. Consider the following case:
Daesh: Daesh fighters pour over the Syria-Iraq border, killing
Iraqi civilians, capturing Iraqi territory and taking over Iraqi
government institutions.
Iraqi forces flee, offering no
resistance.
If we accept a bilateral trigger for NIAC, then the law of armed conflict does
not apply until Iraqi forces “respond by military means,”7 resisting Daesh’s
advance. Until that time, Daesh fighters do not violate the law of armed
conflict or commit war crimes. This result seems deeply unattractive.
Although the Daesh fighters violate Iraqi criminal law, it seems hard to
accept that they do not violate the law of armed conflict. Now consider the
following scenario:
Consent: State A attacks organized armed Group G on the
territory of State T, with the consent of State T. There is no
pre-existing armed conflict between State A and Group G.
State A does not take feasible precautions in attack and
recklessly kills many civilians.
If we accept a bilateral trigger for NIAC, then the law of NIAC does not
apply until Group G responds with military force, resulting in “armed
clashes.”8 Since State T consents, the law of IAC does not apply either. It
follows that State A does not violate the law of armed conflict or commit war
crimes. This result seems intolerable.
Importantly, human rights law may not be sufficient to protect civilians or
armed forces in cross-border cases like those described above. On most views,
human rights law does not apply to the conduct of non-state armed groups that
do not yet exercise territorial control and that fulfill government-like functions.
Moreover, according to some militarily active states, human rights law does
not constrain extraterritorial lethal targeting by state armed forces. Yet, in my
view, such conduct should be constrained by international law.
We should also accept only a nominal intensity threshold for NIAC.
Consider the following case:

7
8

See, e.g., ICRC, supra note 1, ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 280.
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Capture: Members of organized armed Group G mistakenly
cross the unmarked border between State T, in which they
normally operate, and State A. They encounter a unit of State
A’s soldiers, and a minor skirmish ensues. No one is killed, but
one group member is captured by the soldiers while one soldier
is captured by the group and taken back across the border into
State T.
In this case, it seems that both the group member and the soldier should be
entitled to humane treatment under Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.9 Moreover, if there are civilians present when the skirmish
occurs, then it seems that the conduct of the skirmish should be constrained
by customary rules including distinction, precautions, and proportionality. If
those rules are flagrantly violated, then those violations should amount to
war crimes.
In my view, if an organized armed group has the capacity to sustain
military operations then any military operation by or against that group
should be constrained by the law of armed conflict. The organization and
capacity of the group is sufficient to distinguish military operations by or
against the group from “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”10
Some might worry that applying the law of armed conflict to first uses of
low intensity force will displace or reduce the protections of human rights
law. Fortunately, that is not the case. Acts, including uses of lethal force,
that are not prohibited by the law of NIAC may be prohibited by human
rights law—or so I shall argue.
In an earlier exchange, Deborah Pearlstein writes that “it is not possible
as a matter of law to reconcile the basic human rights law prohibition on
killing with the basic [law of armed conflict] LOAC acceptance of the power
to kill as a first resort.”11 I reject the view that the LOAC confers a “power
to kill as a first resort”12 that displaces, overrides, or determines the content
of the human right to life.

9
See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
10
ICRC, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW? (Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.
pdf.
11
Deborah Pearlstein, The NIAC Threshold, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 4, 2016, 4:43 PM), http://
opiniojuris.org/2016/10/04/the-niac-threshold.
12
Id.
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As the ICRC observes elsewhere, “[t]he law relating to the conduct of
hostilities is primarily a law of prohibition: it does not authorize, but
prohibits certain things.”13 The LOAC does not permit but instead prohibits,
does not authorize but instead limits, does not enable but instead constrains.
These prohibitions, limitations, and constraints partially overlap with those
contained in human rights law. Nevertheless, killings that are not prohibited
by the LOAC may be prohibited by human rights law. Certainly, the LOAC
cannot authorize what human rights law forbids.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) prohibit the arbitrary deprivation of
life.14 Measures derogating from this prohibition are prohibited.15
The general prohibition on arbitrary killing applies alongside the specific
prohibitions of the LOAC. As the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights observes, “humanitarian law generally afford[s] victims of armed
conflicts greater or more specific protections than do the more generally
phrased guarantees in . . . human rights instruments.”16 Importantly, these
specific protections provide clearer guidance to combatants than the general
prohibition of arbitrary killing can provide.17
The prohibition on arbitrary deprivation of life may “prohibit status-based
targeting in NIACs when all other relevant principles (proportionality,
distinction, etc.) are observed.”18 In this regard, I agree with the ACHPR’s
Comment:
Where military necessity does not require parties to an armed
conflict to use lethal force in achieving a legitimate military
objective against otherwise lawful targets, but allows the target
13
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I) ¶ 5 (1987), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treatyxsp
?action=OpenDocument& documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4.
14
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Organization of the American States, American Convention on
Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969 O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights art. 4, June. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter ACHR].
15
ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 4(2); ACHR, supra note 14, art. 27.
16
Abella v. Argentina, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. L) No. 11.137, ¶¶ 159–
160 (Nov. 18, 1997) (“It is, moreover, during situations of internal armed conflict that these
two branches of international law most converge and reinforce each other.”).
17
In this regard, the specific rules of the LOAC relate to the general prohibition of arbitrary
killing much like the specific rules of safe driving (speed limits, signaling, and so forth) relate
to the general prohibition of reckless driving.
18
Pearlstein, supra note 11.
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for example to be captured rather than killed, the respect for the
right to life can be best ensured by pursuing this option.19
While we may certainly look to international humanitarian law (IHL) to
inform our interpretation of which deprivations of life are “arbitrary” in
armed conflict, there is no reason to assume that IHL is so perfect that it
effectively prohibits all arbitrary deprivation of life in armed conflict. In the
end, whether a particular deprivation of life is arbitrary remains a question of
human rights law, not of IHL. Our best interpretation of human rights law,
informed but not determined by looking to IHL, should prevail.
Under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
intentional killing is generally prohibited subject to narrow exceptions.20
The mere existence of armed conflict is not among these exceptions.
Instead, the ECHR provides as follows:
1.

2.

In time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take
measures derogating from its obligations under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law.
No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths
resulting from lawful acts of war, . . . shall be made under
this provision.21

Accordingly, the LOAC does not automatically “lift[ ] a prohibition under
which all states otherwise operate.”22 The UK recently conceded as much by
formally derogating from the ECHR.23 “The applicability of the LOAC, by

19

AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 3 ON
THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO LIFE (ARTICLE 4), No.
18, 2015), http://www.achpr.org/files/instructions.general-comments-right-to-life/generaly_c
omment_no_3_english.pdf.
20
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AS AMENDED BY PROTOCOLS NOS. 11 AND 14, art. 2 (Nov. 4,
1950), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
21
Id.
22
Deborah Pearlstein, Comment, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 5, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://opiniojuris.
org/2016/10/04/the-niac-threshold/.
23
Pearlstein, supra note 11.
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itself, does not change the UK’s obligations under the ECHR. Only
derogation, according to the rules of the ECHR, can do that.”24
Moreover, it will be for the courts to determine whether measures
derogating from the ECHR exceed “the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.”25 For example, courts may very well find that,
although the law of NIAC applies throughout the territory of another state
(Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), measures derogating from the ECHR are strictly
required only in certain areas. In other areas, the ECHR may very well apply
with full force.
Human rights law and the law of NIAC do not conflict with each other.
Instead they complement one another, as both impose constraints on violence
rather than licenses to commit violence. As Additional Protocol II makes
clear, human rights law “offers a basic protection to the human person,”
while the law of NIAC aims “to ensure a better protection for the victims of
armed conflicts.”26 Accordingly, “when Protocol II establishes a higher
standard than the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], it must prevail,”
while “provisions of the Covenant . . . which provide for a higher standard of
protection than the protocol should be regarded as applicable” in appropriate
cases.27
Let me end this section with the following observation. If a state
launches an unprovoked attack on an organized armed group, then this attack
initiates a NIAC and is constrained by the law of NIAC. Of course, it does
not violate the law of NIAC to target members of an organized armed group.
The law of NIAC does not prohibit such an unprovoked attack, however, it
may arbitrarily deprive the group members of their lives in violation of
human rights law. In this way, human rights law may regulate the resort to
armed force between states and non-state actors.28
III. FORCE, CONSENT, AND CLASSIFICATION
When one state—say, the United States—uses military force on the
territory of another state—say, Syria or Pakistan—without the consent of that
state, what legal rules constrain that use of such force? What if the attacking
24

Adil Haque, Comment, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 6, 2016, 7:08 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/201
6/10/04/the-niac-threshold.
25
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 15,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
26
MICHAEL BOETHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOL, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 636 (1982).
27
Id.
28
See Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus Ad Bellum, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 687, 725 (2016).
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state does not target the armed forces or institutions of the other state but
instead targets an organized armed group—say, ISIL or the Taliban—
operating in the other state? According to the ICRC Commentary, if one
state uses military force on the territory of another state, then that use of
force triggers an IAC between the two states unless the territorial state
consents to the use of force.29 Accordingly, the law of IAC applies to and
constrains all such uses of force. Importantly, the law of IAC applies even if
the intervening state exclusively targets an organized armed group operating
in the territorial state. If there is a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)
between the intervening state and the armed group, then the law of NIAC
may apply in parallel.
The ICRC’s position has attracted substantial criticism, to which I will
respond in the final section. In this section, I will try to explain why I find
the ICRC’s view persuasive.
Before we begin, let’s remember why the question is worth asking, and
why the answer matters. Conflict classification can seem dry and technical,
but it affects both protection and accountability in armed conflict.
First, the treaty law of IAC is far more detailed and robust than the treaty
law of NIAC. Most importantly, the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I are far more protective of both civilians and combatants than
either Common Article 3 or (with respect to certain internal conflicts)
Additional Protocol II. Second, the customary law of IAC remains distinct
from the customary law of NIAC, though the gap has certainly narrowed
since the 1990s. For its part, the ICRC identifies seventeen customary rules
applicable in IAC but not in NIAC and five applicable in NIAC but not in
IAC. “States that take a more conservative approach to customary
international law may conclude that the gap between IAC and NIAC remains
even wider than the ICRC maintains.”30 Third, grave breaches of IAC treaty
law trigger obligatory universal jurisdiction, meaning that all states have a
legal duty to either prosecute or extradite perpetrators for prosecution
elsewhere.31 Finally, the Statute of the International Criminal Court
recognizes thirty-four war crimes in IAC but only nineteen war crimes in
NIAC.32
Notably, the Statute recognizes clear violation of the

29

ICRC, supra note 1.
J.-M. Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 87 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 198, 198–212 (2005), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-lawrules.pdf.
31
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 49, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
32
Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, art. 8, July
1, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
30
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proportionality rule as a war crime when committed in IAC but not when
committed in NIAC.33 To fix ideas, consider the following scenario:
No Consent: State A launches an airstrike against armed Group
G on the territory of State T, foreseeably killing several
civilians. State T exercises no control over Group G, but also
does not consent to State A’s strike.
According to the Commentary, State A’s strike triggers an IAC with State T
to which the law of IAC applies.34 If there is, in addition, a NIAC between
State A and Group G, then these two conflicts occur in parallel.
Note that conflict classification does not depend on the lawfulness of
State A’s attack under the jus ad bellum.35 For these purposes, it does not
matter whether State A is lawfully defending itself against an armed attack
by Group G or unlawfully using military force to eliminate a possible future
threat.
The ICRC’s position fully reflects the text, object, and purpose of the
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. An international armed
conflict is a dispute (“conflict”) between states (“international”) involving
the use of military force (“armed”).36 It is hard to imagine a more serious
dispute between states than a dispute regarding the use of military force by
one on the territory of the other.
Indeed, states adopted the law of IAC in order to protect their civilian
populations and armed forces from extraterritorial force by foreign states.37
States using force beyond their borders may not recognize many legal,
ethical, or political constraints on their conduct. Accordingly, when State A
uses force on the territory of State T, we need the law of IAC to protect the
civilian population of State T from the military operations of State A and to
protect the armed forces of State A from criminal prosecution by State T.
In contrast, states adopted the law of NIAC primarily to regulate internal
armed conflicts within their own territories.38 States using force on their own
33

Id.
See generally ICRC, supra note 1.
35
ICRC, IHL AND OTHER LEGAL REGIMES—JUS AD BELLUM AND JUS IN BELLO (Oct. 29,
2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellu
m/overview-jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello.htm.
36
ICRC, supra note 4.
37
Adil Ahmad Haque, Whose Armed Conflict? Which Law of Armed Conflict, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 4, 2016, 1:37 PM), https//www.justsecurity.org/33362/armed-conflict-law-ar
med-conflict/. As we shall see, states also adopted the law of IAC in part to protect their
armed forces from criminal prosecution for carrying or extraterritorial force on their behalf.
38
Id.
34
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territory may feel constrained by domestic law, human rights law, concern
for their own citizens, and internal politics. Accordingly, the need for robust
protection by the law of armed conflict may have seemed less urgent. The
alternative view—that no IAC exists and that the law of IAC does not
apply—seems deeply implausible.
First, the law of NIAC may not apply either. On the prevailing view,
including that of the ICRC, the law of NIAC applies only to protracted
armed confrontations between state armed forces and organized armed
groups or between such groups.39 If Group G is not organized in the right
way, or if fighting between State A and Group G is not sufficiently intense,
then a gap in protection would exist that no state would accept. I partially
reject the prevailing view and partially disagree with the ICRC on this point.
Second, it is hard to believe that states would want legal protection for
their civilians from foreign forces to depend on which targets those foreign
forces choose. If an intervening state targets the armed forces of the
territorial state, then civilians may receive robust protection under Additional
Protocol I.40 In contrast, if an intervening state targets an organized armed
group, then civilians may receive only the minimal protections of Common
Article 3—which, arguably, does not regulate the conduct of hostilities at
all.41 Defenders of the alternative view must explain why states would
accept such limited protection for their civilians from foreign forces in such
cases.
Third, in internal NIACs, states may be constrained in their treatment of
their citizens by human rights law and by domestic law. In contrast, in crossborder cases, IHL is the primary—though not exclusive—constraint on the
intervening state’s conduct. Accordingly, in cross-border cases, we should
not rely on the law of NIAC to provide civilians with the level of protection
envisioned by the parties to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.
The customary law of NIAC now offers civilians protection comparable
to that offered by the customary law of IAC. However, we should interpret
Common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions in light of the
customary law of NIAC as it existed when those treaties were adopted and
entered into force. At that time, no state would have relied on the customary
law of NIAC to protect their civilians from foreign states operating on their
territory without their consent.
Fourth, the alternative view exposes the forces of the intervening state to
criminal prosecution by the territorial state. There is no combatant immunity

39
40
41

ICRC, supra note 4.
Id.
Id.
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in NIAC and, on the alternative view, there is no IAC. It follows that, if
State T captures State A’s pilot, then State T may prosecute the pilot for
killing its civilians under State T’s domestic criminal law even if the strike
did not violate the targeting rules of the customary law of NIAC.
State T’s capture of the pilot may itself trigger an IAC between the two
states, such that the law of IAC would regulate his detention. However, the
strike occurred prior to capture and therefore, on the alternative view, before
an IAC began. Hence, the pilot would not be entitled to combatant immunity
with respect to the strike. Since combatant immunity exists to protect
combatants from prosecution by foreign states for acts that do not violate the
law of armed conflict, it is hard to see why states would deny their own
forces such protection in such cases.
Finally, the alternative view seems ad hoc. If one state uses military
force against anything else in another state—citizens, state armed forces, or
foreign visitors, private property, state institutions, or refugee camps—then it
seems clear that an IAC exists and that the law of IAC applies. Defenders of
the alternative view must justify carving out an exception to this general rule
for strikes directed at armed groups. Given the evident need to protect
civilians from the intervening state and to protect captured combatants from
the territorial state, such a justification seems hard to imagine.
For these reasons, the ICRC’s position prevails over the alternative view.
The use of force by one state on the territory of another should be
constrained by the law of IAC, even if that force targets an organized armed
group on that territory, unless the territorial state consents to that use of
force.
IV. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES
In this final section, I will respond to some criticisms of the ICRC’s
position. Along the way, I will make some more general comments on the
relationship between the law of force (jus ad bellum) and the law of armed
conflict (jus in bello).
Perhaps the most sustained critique of the ICRC’s position comes from
Terry Gill, in a recent article for International Law Studies.42 There is much
42
Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in Syria, 92 INT’L STUD. 353 (2016). See also
Sean Watts, The Updated First Geneva Convention Commentary, DOD’s Law of War
Manual, and a More Perfect Law of War, Part I, JUST SECURITY (July 5, 2016, 11:05 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/31749/updated-geneva-convention-commentary-dods-lowm-perf
ect-law-war/; Kenneth Watkin, The ICRC Updated Commentaries: Reconciling Form and
Substance, Part I, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 24, 2016, 2:17 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/325
38/icrc-updated-commentaries-reconciling-form-substance/; Kenneth Watkin, The ICRC
Updated Commentaries: Reconciling Form and Substance, Part II, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 30,
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to admire in Gill’s article (indeed, I recently assigned it to my students).
However, I found his criticisms of the ICRC’s position unpersuasive.
First, Gill rejects “the argument that non-consensual military intervention
automatically constitutes a violation of sovereignty and is therefore directed
against the territorial State,” on the grounds that the intervention may be a
lawful exercise of self-defense or may be authorized by the UN Security
Council.43
This objection seems misdirected. The ICRC does not refer to a violation
of sovereignty but instead to an “interference”44 or “intrusion”45 into the
territorial state’s sphere of sovereignty. By definition, a violation of
sovereignty is unlawful. In contrast, an interference or intrusion into a
state’s sphere of sovereignty may be lawful or unlawful. According to the
ICRC, an armed interference with or intrusion into a state’s sphere of
sovereignty—whether unlawful aggression or lawful self-defense—will
trigger an armed conflict with that state.46
Second, and relatedly, Gill writes that “there is no reason to assume that
the classification of an armed conflict is dependent upon—or even
influenced by—the question of whether a violation of the jus ad bellum has
occurred.”47
This objection also seems misplaced. On the ICRC’s view, the
classification of an armed conflict does not depend upon the lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the use of force, but instead upon the fact that force is used
by one state on the territory of another without its consent.48
Of course, if the territorial state consents to the use of force, then (i) the
use of force is lawful under the jus ad bellum, and (ii) there is no armed
conflict between the two states. However, the reason that there is no armed
2016, 10:36 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/32608/icrc-updated-commentaries-reconcilin
g-form-substance/.
43
Gill, supra note 42, at 368.
44
ICRC, supra note 1, ¶ 237 (“Any unconsented-to military operations by one State in the
territory of another State should be interpreted as an armed interference in the latter’s sphere
of sovereignty and thus may be an international armed conflict under Article 2(1).”).
45
Id. ¶ 261 (“In some cases, the intervening State may claim that the violence is not
directed against the government or the State’s infrastructure but, for instance, only at another
Party it is fighting within the framework of a transnational, cross-border or spillover noninternational armed conflict. Even in such cases, however, that intervention constitutes an
unconsented-to armed intrusion into the territorial State’s sphere of sovereignty, amounting to
an international armed conflict within the meaning of common Article 2(1).”).
46
Id. ¶¶ 236–237.
47
Gill, supra note 42, at 369.
48
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conflict between the states is not that the use of force is lawful, but rather
that there is no conflict at all between the states, armed or otherwise. There
is no dispute, difference, opposition, or hostile relationship between the two
states. Put another way, the fact that consent has been given or withheld is
independently relevant to both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
In his second post, Watkin writes that the ICRC’s “reliance on State
consent, as the basis for conflict categorization, makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to separate it from the law governing the recourse to war.”49 I
respectfully disagree.
The jus ad bellum and the jus in bello are independent in the sense that a
use of force may be lawful under one body of law but unlawful under the
other. A war of aggression may strictly conform to the law of armed
conflict, while a war of self-defense may flagrantly violate the law of armed
conflict. At the same time, we do not conflate jus ad bellum and jus in bello
simply by recognizing that certain factual circumstances (such as consent or
non-consent) may be relevant to both bodies of law. For example, if one
state exercises effective control over part of the territory of another state then
this will ordinarily give rise to a belligerent occupation.50 Of course, if the
territorial state consents, then there is no belligerent occupation—not
because the occupation is lawful but because there is no belligerency. The
same logic applies to the use of armed force and the existence of armed
conflict.
Third, Gill notes that “neither the text of the relevant provisions in the
Geneva Conventions (Common Articles 2 and 3) nor the original ICRC
commentaries thereto contain any reference to violation of sovereignty as a
criterion for determining the character of the armed conflict.”51 Nor does the
ICTY’s Tadić judgment, which Gill rightly describes as “the leading judicial
decision on the classification of armed conflicts.”52
Since the Geneva Conventions do not tell us when an armed conflict
between states exists, we must interpret their terms in light of their context,
object, and purpose. The original ICRC commentaries state that “[a]ny
difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
members of the armed forces” gives rise to an armed conflict between those

49
Kenneth Watkin, The ICRC Updated Commentaries: Reconciling Form and Substance,
Part II, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 30, 2016, 10:36 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/32608/icrcupdated-commentaries-reconciling-form-substance-part-ii/.
50
See generally ICRC, supra note 1, ¶ 304 (describing conditions necessary for occupation).
51
Gill, supra note 42, at 370.
52
Id. at 371.

2017]

WHOSE ARMED CONFLICT?

489

states.53 It is hard to imagine a more serious difference arising between two
States than a difference regarding whether one may use armed force on the
territory of the other. If such a difference leads to intervention by the armed
forces of either state, then an armed conflict automatically arises.
In Tadić, the ICTY stated that “an armed conflict exists whenever there is
a resort to armed force between States.”54 Importantly, “armed force
between States” does not require that two states use armed force against one
another but instead requires that one state uses armed force against another.55
Now we approach the heart of the matter. What does it mean for one
state to use force “against” another? On the ICRC’s view, an armed
interference in a state’s sphere of sovereignty is a use of force against that
state.56
Why invoke the concept of sovereignty in this context? States are legal
persons, not physical persons or objects.57 Strictly speaking, one cannot use
physical force against a legal person, such as a state or corporation. One can,
however, use physical force against a physical entity—a person, place, or
object—over which a legal person has legal rights. There is nothing else that
physical force against a legal person could sensibly mean. On this approach,
physical force is used against a state when physical force is used against a
physical entity within that state’s sphere of sovereignty. There is nothing
else that physical force against a state could sensibly mean.
Gill claims that “a State uses force against another State when it engages
in hostilities against its armed forces, attacks national assets under the
territorial State’s control, or occupies its territory.”58 On this view, a state
that launches terror attacks on the civilian population of another State or
bombs refugee camps owned and operated by the UN or an INGO in the
territory of another State does not use force against that State. This view
seems hard to accept.
53

ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD
¶ 1 (1st ed. 1952), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary.
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ICRC, supra note 1, ¶ 218 (referencing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
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the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)).
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See, e.g., ICRC, supra note 4.
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Gill also claims that “an intrusion or violation of sovereignty in itself does
not determine whether conflict between them exists. If that were the case,
any unlawful aerial incursion would seemingly trigger an armed conflict.
That would be hard to defend considering the frequency at which such
incursions occur.”59
This objection seems misplaced for two reasons. First, the Commentary
is quite clear that the intrusions to which it refers are armed interventions,60
and armed intrusions61 involving violence,62 that is, to attacks63 on the state’s
territory. Second, the Commentary clearly
rule[s] out the possibility of including in the scope of
application of humanitarian law situations that are the result of
a mistake or of individual ultra vires acts, which — even if
they might entail the international responsibility of the State T
o which the individual who committed the acts belongs — are
not endorsed by the State concerned. Such acts would not
amount to armed conflict.64
Accordingly, an unlawful but harmless aerial incursion, resulting from a
pilot’s mistake or contrary to a pilot’s instructions, would not trigger an
armed conflict between the two states.
Fourth, and most importantly, Gill identifies several examples involving
extraterritorial force targeting armed groups in which “the States concerned
[n]either verbally [n]or factually conduct themselves as if they were involved
in an armed conflict, even though they may not have consented to the
interventions and may have considered them a violation of their sovereignty
(irrespective of whether they did constitute such violations).”65 These
examples include military operations by the United States inside Pakistan
and Yemen; by Turkey inside Iraq; by Kenya inside Somalia; and by
Colombia inside Ecuador.66
Admirably, Gill allows that “the lack of hostilities between the
intervening and territorial States in these examples may be in whole or in
part due to other factors.”67 For its part, the Commentary states that
59
60
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64
65
66
67
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[e]ven if none of the Parties recognize the existence of a state
of war or of an armed conflict, humanitarian law would still
apply provided that an armed conflict is in fact in
existence. . . . The fact that a State does not, for political or
other reasons, explicitly refer to the existence of an armed
conflict within the meaning of Article 2(1) in a particular
situation does not prevent it from being legally classified as
such.68
Nevertheless, could the absence of such claims, or the denial of such claims,
constitute “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty [in this case,
the Geneva Conventions] which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation?”69
State silence is inherently ambiguous. We cannot know if a state’s
silence is attributable to its legal positions, or what those legal positions
might be. Accordingly, we should consider only the explicit legal positions
of states that the law of IAC applies or does not apply. For example, Syria
might announce that it is not in an IAC with the UK and that, accordingly,
UK forces captured in Syria are not entitled to combatant immunity for acts
preceding their capture. The UK would no doubt respond with its own legal
opinion, based on its own classification of the conflict and identification of
applicable legal rules.
Until subsequent practice establishes the agreement of the parties to the
Geneva Conventions regarding their interpretation in such cases, we should
interpret the terms of the Conventions in light of their object and purpose.
As discussed in the previous section, the object and purpose of the law of
IAC is the protection of civilians, civilian objects, and combatants from
hostile foreign states. As the ICRC puts it:
[I]t is useful to recall that the population and public property of
the territorial State may also be present in areas where the
armed group is present and some group members may also be
residents or citizens of the territorial State, such that attacks
against the armed group will concomitantly affect the local
population and the State’s infrastructure. For these reasons and
others, it better corresponds to the factual reality to conclude
that an international armed conflict arises between the

68
69
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ICRC, supra note 1, ¶ 213.
Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties, art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155, U.N.T.S.
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territorial State and the intervening State when force is used on
the former’s territory without its consent.70
Strangely, in his first post on Just Security, Watkin objects that, by adverting
to this factual reality, the ICRC “prioritizes form over substance” because the
harm to civilians “may be a mere possibility.”71 Instead, Watkin suggests
that conflict categorization should be based on “an assessment of what
actually happens.”72 On this view, it seems that we will not know what law
applies to a use of force until after the use of force is carried out. Among
other things, we will not know which legal protections civilians enjoy until it
is too late. This seems like an unattractive view.
For his part, Gill acknowledges that “an intervention may impact portions
of a State’s population or its national resources,” but he writes that
when a population and public property are under the control of
an [organized armed group] and not under the effective control
of the territorial State, they can no longer be identified with
that State for purposes of determining the legal constraints on
the conduct of hostilities. In the event the intervening State’s
action resulted in occupation of territory, this would change the
situation and trigger the regime pertaining to IACs.73
Watkin seems to make a similar claim in his first post on Just Security.
Strikingly, Gill provides no support for the first sentence, which is hardly
self-evident. Indeed, the first sentence seems to implicitly concede that
persons and public property under the effective control of the territorial State
can be identified with that State for purposes of conflict classification.
Accordingly, if a member of an armed group travels through an area under
the effective control of the territorial state then an attack in that area,
potentially impacting nearby persons and property, would seem to constitute
an attack on the state itself.
Moreover, the second sentence seems to undermine the first. According
to Gill, territory under the control of an armed group remains sufficiently
identified with the territorial state such that, if the intervening state occupies
that territory, then an IAC arises between the two states. However,
70
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according to Gill, territory under the control of an armed group is not
sufficiently identified with the territorial state such that, if the intervening
state uses force on that territory, then an IAC arises between the two states. I
can see no legal or logical basis for this incongruous result.
In an earlier exchange, Gill clarified his position as follows:
If the territorial State no longer controls the territory or public
property in a particular part of that State because it is under the
control of the armed group, an attack against the armed group
controlling it is in my view not tantamount to an attack on the
territorial State because the attack is not directed against the
territorial State.74
Gill takes the view that an attack is directed against a state only if it is
directed at that state’s armed forces or national assets. Accordingly, on his
view, an attack against an armed group is not directed against the territorial
state even if the armed group does not control the area in which it is attacked.
Put the other way around, an armed group’s control over territory is
irrelevant to whether an attack against that group is tantamount to an attack
on the territorial State. Gill offers no support for his proffered control
criterion because, in fact, the issue of control is superfluous to his account.
This view is implausibly narrow.
Finally, Gill observes that “most [academic] authorities take the position
that the classification of armed conflicts primarily (but not exclusively) turns
on the nature of the parties . . . .”75 This begs the question to say that, in the
cases under discussion, the two states are not parties to an armed conflict.
After all, if the ICRC is correct, then the two states are parties to an armed
conflict.
In this section, I have tried to address the most substantial criticisms of
the ICRC’s position. No doubt, other objections have been and will be
raised—we should expect no less. The controversy that the ICRC’s position
has elicited is, perhaps, the best evidence that conflict classification remains
highly relevant to the legal regulation of armed conflict.
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